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### **BSI Standards Publication**

Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems



#### **National foreword**

This Published Document is the UK implementation of CEN ISO/TR 12489:2016. It is identical to ISO/TR 12489:2013. It supersedes PD ISO/TR 12489:2013 which is withdrawn.

The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical Committee PSE/17, Materials and equipment for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries.

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## TECHNICAL REPORT CEN ISO/TR 12489

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#### **English Version**

# Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries - Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems (ISO/TR 12489:2013)

Pétrole, pétrochimie et gaz naturel - Modélisation et calcul fiabilistes des systèmes de sécurité (ISO/TR 12489:2013)

Erdöl-, petrochemische und Erdgasindustrie -Zuverlässigkeit der Modellierung und Berechnung von Sicherheitssystemen (ISO/TR 12489:2013)

This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 28 March 2015. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 12.

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#### **European foreword**

This document (CEN ISO/TR 12489:2016) has been prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 "Materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries" in collaboration with Technical Committee CEN/TC 12 "Materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries" the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

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#### Foreword

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The committee responsible for this document is ISO/TC 67, *Materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries.* 

This first edition of ISO/TR 12489 belongs of the family of reliability related standards developed by ISO/TC 67:

- ISO 14224, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment
- ISO 20815, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries Production assurance and reliability management

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#### Introduction

Safety systems have a vital function in petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries where safety systems range from simple mechanical safety devices to safety instrumented systems.

They share three important characteristics which make them difficult to handle:

- 1) They should be designed to achieve good balance between safety and production. This implies a high probability of performing the safety action as well as a low frequency of spurious actions.
- 2) Some of their failures are not revealed until relevant periodic tests are performed to detect and repair them.
- 3) A given safety system rarely works alone. It generally belongs to a set of several safety systems (so-called multiple safety systems) working together to prevent accidents.

Therefore improving safety may be detrimental to dependability and vice versa. These two aspects should therefore, ideally, be handled at the same time by the same reliability engineers. However, in reality they are generally considered separately and handled by different persons belonging to different departments. Moreover this is encouraged by the international safety standards, which exclude dependability from their scopes, and the international dependability (see 3.1.1) standard, which excludes safety from theirs. This may lead to dangerous situations (e.g. safety system disconnected because of too many spurious trips) as well as high production losses.

The proof of the conservativeness of probabilistic calculations of safety systems is generally required by safety authorities. Unfortunately, managing the systemic dependencies introduced by the periodic tests to obtain conservative results implies mathematical difficulties which are frequently ignored. The impact is particularly noticeable for redundant safety systems and multiple safety systems. Awareness of these challenges is important for reliability engineers as well as safety managers and decision makers, utilizing reliability analytical support.

Most of the methods and tools presently applied in reliability engineering have been developed since the 1950s before the emergence of personal computers when only pencil and paper were available. At that time the reliability pioneers could only manage simplified models and calculations but this has completely changed because of the tremendous improvement in the computation means achieved over the past 30 years. Nowadays, models and calculations which were once impossible are carried out with a simple laptop computer. Flexible (graphical) models and powerful algorithms based on sound mathematics are now available to handle "industrial size" systems (i.e. many components with complex interactions). This allows the users to focus on the analysis of the systems and assessment of results, rather than on the calculations themselves. All the approaches described in this Technical Report have been introduced in the petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries as early as the 1970s where they have proven to be very effective. They constitute the present time state-of-the-art in reliability calculations. Nevertheless some of them have not been widely disseminated in this sector although they can be of great help for reliability engineers to overcome the problems mentioned above. This is particularly true when quantitative reliability or availability requirements need confirmation and/or when the objective of the reliability study lay beyond the scope of the elementary approaches.

The present document is a "technical" report and its content is obviously "technical". Nevertheless, it only requires a basic knowledge in probabilistic calculation and mathematics and any skilled reliability engineer should have no difficulties in using it.

## Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems

#### 1 Scope

This Technical Report aims to close the gap between the state-of-the-art and the application of probabilistic calculations for the safety systems of the petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries. It provides guidelines for reliability and safety system analysts and the oil and gas industries to:

- understand the correct meaning of the definitions used in the reliability field;
- identify
  - the safety systems which may be concerned,
  - the difficulties encountered when dealing with reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems,
  - the relevant probabilistic parameters to be considered;
- be informed of effective solutions overcoming the encountered difficulties and allowing to undertake the calculations of relevant probabilistic parameters;
- obtain sufficient knowledge of the principles and framework (e.g. the modelling power and limitations) of the well-established approaches currently used in the reliability field:
  - analytical formulae;[1][2][13]
  - Boolean:
    - reliability block diagrams;
    - fault trees:[5]
  - sequential: event trees, [8] cause consequence diagrams [10] and LOPA; [9]
  - Markovian:[6]
  - Petri nets; [7]
- obtain sufficient knowledge of the principles of probabilistic evaluations:
  - analytical calculations (e.g. performed on Boolean or Markovian models);[1][2][3]
  - and Monte Carlo simulation (e.g. performed on Petri nets<sup>[7]</sup>);
- select an approach suitable with the complexity of the related safety system and the reliability study which is undertaken:
- handle safety and dependability (e.g. for production assurance purpose, see <u>3.1.1</u>) within the same reliability framework.

The elementary approaches (e.g. PHA, HAZID, HAZOP, FMECA) are out of the scope of this Technical Report. Yet they are of utmost importance and ought to be applied first as their results provide the input information essential to properly undertake the implementation of the approaches described in this Technical Report: analytical formulae, Boolean approaches (reliability block diagrams, fault trees, event trees, etc.), Markov graphs and Petri nets.